For almost 70 years between 1895 and 1963, Kenya was considered a “white man’s land”. Like Zimbabwe and South Africa (British), Algeria (French) and Namibia (German), Kenya was a special colony, a jewel in the crown of the British Empire and increasingly the entire Western world.

Kenya’s special place in the Western imagination is exemplified by America’s response to critical transitions over the past six decades. At the height of the Cold War in the heady 1960s, America sent William Attwood as ambassador to ensure Kenya was on an even keel as a pro-Western nation. The American diplomat published the controversial autobiography: The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (1967). When the Cold War ended, America sent another journalist, Smith Hempstone, as ambassador during the crucial 1989-1993 hiatus. His memoir, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (1997) reveals his mission in Kenya as pushing for multi-party elections and liberal democracy in one-party Kenya. And in the 21st century characterized by US geopolitical competition with China, in 2022 Washington sent Margaret (Meg) Whitman, the American business leader and billionaire (worth a modest $3.4 billion) as the US ambassador to Kenya to roll back Chinese growing economic footprint and making US capital and Western financial institutions influential again in Kenya.

But how exactly was the Gen Z movement humbled? Two strategies can be distinguished. First, all genres of violence were used to prevent youth from assembling peacefully, including the use of non-uniformed armed officers, infiltration of their movements by hired thugs, abductions and murders. As a result, more than 55 protesters have died and many more abducted since the demonstrations started in June, according to the state-funded Kenya National Commission on Human Rights.

Second, Kenya and its partners in the West seem to have resorted to the well-known ‘opposition strategy’ to engage Gen Z.

The West’s opposition strategy first appeared in the International Crisis Group (ICG) African report entitled: Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy, (N°117, 24 August 2006). The script for this strategy was tested in Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008. One of the elements of the strategy is creating and supporting an opposition leader often with a larger-than-life personality – exemplified by two friends, Raila Odinga in Kenya and Morgan Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe. The second part is to unite the opposition and civil society to form a super opposition movement with enormous political capacity. Third is to pressure the government to share power with the opposition in a transitional government, giving Western actors control of decision-making leverage in government. In a word, the “Opposition Strategy” ensures that both the opposition and the government are safe for the West. It is a perfect neo-colonial tool.

The Gen Z movement challenged the West’s oppositional approach. It has therefore been seen as a potential cause of instability and an existential threat to Western interests.

The Gen Z movement registered quick victories in June. President Ruto withdrew the controversial Finance Bill 2024; sacked his entire cabinet and promised to form a new “broad-based” government. The former Inspector General of Police, Japhet Koome, resigned after being widely accused of extreme brutality against peaceful protesters. But these gains were quickly rolled back. Dr. Ruto reappointed six CSs in the old cabinet and gave four posts to the opposition, including the powerful finance and energy ministries. Paradoxically, while anger over the new government appointments was part of the cause of the Nane Nane protests, the broad government managed to limit the protests to Nairobi and its environs. Major cities such as Kisumu (Raila’s home town), Eldoret (Ruto’s town) and Mombasa (home to newly appointed opposition leaders, Ali Joho and Opiyo Wandayi) which have seen protests in the past remained calm. This allowed the government to mobilize enough police to quell protests in the capital. Although Nane Nane’s protest organizers hoped to bring five million Kenyans into the capital, the use of tear gas, growing roadblocks on major roads and to disperse protesters, and mass arrests prevented protesters from accessing the central business district.

Heavy security was deployed at State House where the new cabinet was sworn in and protesters had threatened to storm.

It is now up to the government to address the issues raised by the young people. So far, Kenya is a perfect dialogue for the deaf. The government is focused on its détente with the Raila wing of the opposition as an “alliance of rivals.” But Kenya’s young protesters have dismissed the new cabinet as merely enforcing deals among the political elite, ignoring serious governance issues they have raised.

Kenya is no longer at ease. Its youth have vowed to continue demonstrating for justice for those killed or abducted and “until the president resigns”. In the corridors of diplomacy, on August 8, the United States warned that it will not accept any further abductions and killings of innocent protesters, and called for immediate action against human rights abuses.

For now, the Kenyan youth’s dreams may have been put on hold, but not for long.

Professor Peter Kagwanja is a former government adviser and currently the Executive Director of the Africa Policy Institute. Kagwanja is also the author of Killing the vote: state-sponsored violence and flawed elections in Kenya. A Report of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (Nairobi: Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 1998).